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INTRODUCTION
Fears of black- box algorithms are multi-
plying. They are said to prevent account-
ability,1 to make it harder to detect bias2 
and so on. Some fears concern the episte-
mology of black- box algorithms in medi-
cine and the ethical implications of that 
epistemology. In ‘Who is afraid of black 
box algorithms? On the epistemological 
and ethical basis of trust in medical AI,’3 
Juan Durán and Jongsma seek to allay 
such fears. While we find some of their 
arguments compelling, we still see reasons 
for fear.
The gap between epistemic and 
normative justification
Duránand Jongsma’s main claim is that 
black- box algorithms can confer epis-
temic justification.They helpfully note the 
scope of this claim’s implications: its truth 
would not alone give the ethical stamp of 
approval to decisions that are informed 
by black- box algorithms. For example, a 
clinician may be epistemically justified—
on the basis of a black- box algorithm’s 
diagnosis—in believing that a patient has 
cancer without thereby being normatively 
justified in (say) administering chemo-
therapy. The epistemic justification can 
inform the decision, but further, moral 
considerations are needed to normatively 
justify it. This is a general point about the 
different natures of epistemic and norma-
tive justification.
Yet, especially in the medical context, 
the distinction between epistemic and 
normative considerations are not always 
clear- cut. For example, an algorithm 
that looks like it plays a purely epistemic 
role—such as one that diagnoses a given 
condition—may implicitly encode norma-
tive considerations about what counts as 
a ‘healthy’ or ‘normal’ body.4 Another 
example might be an algorithm that 
recommends treatments, where consid-
erations about an algorithm’s reliability 
bleed into the normative judgments about 
how to treat patients.
Understanding Durán and Jongsma on 
epistemic trustworthiness
Some opponents of black- box algorithms, 
Durán and Jongsma write, assume that 
transparency is necessary for ‘epistemic 
trustworthiness’. If true, black- box algo-
rithms would indeed be worrisome. 
(Imagine a doctor prescribing a medica-
tion because an algorithm she is not justi-
fied in believing diagnosed the patient 
with a certain condition.)
As noted, Durán and Jongsma reject 
this assumption, maintaining that ‘compu-
tationally reliability’ is sufficient for epis-
temic trustworthiness: ‘[C]omputational 
reliabilism, which does not require trans-
parency and supports the reliability of 
algorithms, justifies the belief that results 
of medical AI are to be trusted’ (p. 1).
While we find this thought intriguing, 
we would like to know more about how 
Durán and Jongsma think about how 
transparency and epistemic trustworthi-
ness relate to one another. In a different 
part of the article, Durán et al seem to 
imply that transparency is necessary for 
epistemic trustworthiness: ‘transparency 
by itself is necessary, although not suffi-
cient for entrenching the reliability of 
black- box algorithms and the overall trust-
worthiness of their results’ (p. 9).
Trust and automation complacency
Even if black- box algorithms can be epis-
temically trustworthy, they may nonethe-
less not engender the appropriate levels 
of trust in people. Trust is primarily a 
psychological state, and it is well docu-
mented that human beings are suscep-
tible to being too trusting of algorithms. 
Automation complacency is the tendency 
to overestimate the reliability of decision 
support systems. In the medical context, 
automation complacency could prove 
particularly dangerous. While Durán et al 
give a conceptual argument that black- box 
algorithms are epistemically trustworthy, 
there is an open empirical question of 
whether black- box algorithms are more 
or less likely to engender automation 
complacency.
Transparency would allow practitioners 
to retrace algorithmic recommendations 
and achieve some familiarity with the 
algorithm’s workings. We wonder whether 
transparency in turn could provide at least 
some protection against complacency, 
since a clinician can be held more account-
able for her decisions.
When black-box algorithms hide 
normative assumptions
As pointed out above, epistemic and 
normative considerations often blur into 
each other in the medical setting. This 
means, among other things, that black- box 
algorithms can interfere with normative 
deliberation. Suppose we have a clinician 
and patient who are confronted with a 
black- box algorithm that recommends 
a certain course of chemotherapy. How 
do they proceed? Because the algorithm 
is not transparent, patient and clinician 
are unable to interrogate the basis for 
the recommendation; they have limited 
grounds to determine whether, for 
instance, the decision reflects particular 
evaluative judgments about pain toler-
ance, longevity, bodily integrity, resuscita-
tion preferences and so on. In such a case, 
we believe, the non- transparency of the 
algorithm may undermine governing prin-
ciples of medical ethics, including patient 
autonomy and informed consent.
Computational reliability over time
Let us grant Durán et al’s key claim 
that computationally reliable black- box 
medical algorithms are epistemically 
trustworthy. It must be noted that an 
algorithm that is computationally reliable 
in one setting at one time might not be 
everywhere and forever computationally 
reliable.
Machine learning algorithms typically 
work with historical data that might 
become obsolete. Imagine that a black- box 
algorithm is computationally reliable, 
at some time, in diagnosing the severity 
of a patient’s cancer. At this time, some 
patients live within a certain zip code 
where there is a toxic factory. Whenever 
there is doubt in the result of, say, an MRI 
of a patient who lives in this zip code, the 
algorithm rightly diagnoses a patient with 
a serious form of cancer. If, 5 years later, 
the factory is shut down and the increased 
risk of severe cancer disappears, the algo-
rithm may then be overdiagnosing the 
seriousness of cancer in patients from that 
zip code. When patients have unnecessary 
surgery (eg, the removal of a tumour that 
would have never become a health threat), 
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it is hard to identify the overtreatment. 
Only with randomised controlled trials5—
and not with the markers of computational 
reliability that Durán et al argue for—can 
we realise that an algorithm is leading us 
to overtreatment.
CONCLUSION
While black- box algorithms are new, ill- 
understood processes have long been 
adopted in medicine; for example, we 
have used aspirin for many more years 
than we have understood it. More work 
is needed to reflect on the differences 
and similarities between black- box algo-
rithms and traditional medical treat-
ments whose workings are opaque to us. 
For starters, the mechanism of aspirin is 
constant over time, but many black- box 
algorithms change as they get new infor-
mation. Furthermore, how aspirin works 
is a natural fact; how algorithms work 
depends on us. Better understanding the 
ethical implications of those differences 
will give us a window into just how afraid 
we should be of black- box algorithms in 
medicine.
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